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Abstract 
Using a unique hand-collected nationwide survey, this paper studies China’s privatization, 
by far the largest one in human history. We find that privatization in China has improved 
performance, but only for firms bought out by managers (MBOs). Consistent with 
improved performance, MBO firms are less likely be influenced by the state in their daily 
operation and are more likely to take various restructuring measures. We also find city 
governments with stronger fiscal disciplines and with less political burdens of disposing 
laid-off works tend to use the MBO method to privatize. Our empirical design deals with 
the selection issues by applying a difference-in-difference approach and an IV approach.  
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Introduction 
 
Privatization of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) is the core issue of transforming 
centralized economies into market economies. Privatization in Central-Eastern economies 
(CEE) and in Russia has been studied intensively (Frydman et al., 1999; Barberis et al., 
1996).  Little, however is known about privatization in China, the large one in human 
history.2 
Compared with Russia and CEE, China’s privatization has some distinct features. In 
contrast to mass privatization, where privatization was pushed through by their central 
governments as a high priority at the beginning of the transition in the early 1990s, the Chinese 
government tried to avoid privatization as much as they can and privatization was delayed for 
more than a decade. Facing the political and ideological constraints, privatization in China was 
initiated by some city governments.  Although the endorsement of the central government in 
the late 1990s is critically important for a nationwide privatization, in general it is city 
governments’ decisions on whether privatize and how to privatization for SOEs (COEs) within 
their jurisdictions.  
Large-scale privatization occurred in the late 1990s. An estimation based on our survey 
is that between 1998 and 2005, more than ninety thousand firms with more than 11 trillion 
RMB (1.4 trillion US$) worth of assets were privatized, encompassing two-thirds of China’s 
SOEs and state assets. This makes China’s privatization the largest one in the world.  
Nevertheless, the process was so quiet that beyond a small number of China specialists it was 
not much noticed by the outside world and it is seriously under-researched. This is an 
                                                 
2 Most of the studies of China’s privatization is on share issue privatization, which, as we show later, is a 
tiny proportion (1%) of all privatization programs. 
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unfortunate omission. In addition to its sheer size, the great importance of China’s 
privatization stems from its distinct differences from other privatization programs around the 
world and its far reaching impacts to the Chinese economy.  
The main hurdle to studying China’s privatization has been a lack of systematic 
data. To this end, we have conducted a nationwide survey of 3059 firms, based on 
stratified random sampling of industrial firms with sales above 5 million RMB. Our 
sample well represents the national population in ownership, industry, region, and size. It 
includes privatized firms, non-privatized SOEs and collectively-owned enterprises 
(COEs), de novo domestic private firms, and foreign firms, etc.  The following are the 
major questions to be addressed in this paper. 
1. Has China’s privatization brought about improved operating efficiency? 
2. What are the specific mechanisms, which make privatization effective in 
improving performance? Specifically,  
a. Did privatization change corporate governance and allocation of control 
rights? 
b. Has privatization strengthened incentives within the firms? 
c. Has privatization brought about restructuring measures such as personnel 
changes and new business strategies? 
3. What specific privatization method(s) are associated with deeper restructuring and 
thus better performance?  
4. What factors affected city governments’ decisions on how to privatize?   
Our results suggest that in China certain privatization method and 
specificallymanagement buyouts (MBOs), which account for close to half of all privatization 
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programs, are successful. We find that city government withdrew from corporate decisions in 
MBO firms; MBOs are more likely to changed members of core management team, to adopted 
international accounting standard and professional independent auditing, and to establish board 
of directors. As a result, MBO privatization in China has improved the performance. In 
contrast, non-MBO privatized firms did not take major restructuring measures and city 
government still intervene their operations. Not surprisingly, those privatization programs did 
not improve performance.   
The success of MBOs in China is in contrast to the findings in the previous 
literature on Eastern Europe and Russia that insider privatization does not improve 
efficiency (Barberis et al., 1996). This is likely due to some key differences between the 
institutional environment at the time of mass privatization in other transitional economies 
and that in China. At the time of mass privatization, the countries in Eastern Europe had 
not established product markets, labor markets, or financial markets. Private ownership 
was an unfamiliar phenomenon. Under this situation, managers or private owners may 
not have had sustained interest in running their firms, nor do they have a clear exit 
strategy. In contrast, when the delayed privatization in China occurred, market 
institutions had been developed and, equally importantly, the private sector had already 
become a big part of the economy. Moreover, the capital market had developed enough to 
provide the new owners an exit strategy to fully capitalize fully on their efficiency gains.  
There is a growing empirical literature that studies implementation and 
performance of China’s privatization. To our knowledge, almost all the existing studies 
are not based on nationwide data except Su and Jeffferson (2006). Li and Rozelle (2000) 
study 88 privatized township enterprises in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. Song and 
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Yao (2004) and Garnault, Song and Yao (2005) use firm-level data covering 683 firms in 
11 cities from 1995-2001. The study by Liu and Lu (2005) is based on survey data 
collected from 451 firms in five cities and four sectors during the 1994-1999. Yusuf et al. 
(2005) reported on a survey of 736 firms from five cities and seven sectors from 1996 to 
2001. Based on the NBS census dataset of large-medium enterprises, Su and Jefferson 
(2006) studies the conversion of SOEs into shareholding. All of these papers find that 
privatization has improved profitability. Our paper differs from the existing literature in 
the following aspects: a) we examine the specific channels that lead to better performance; 
b) our data is based on a large-sample nationwide survey, stratified by region, industry, 
and size, which ensures the generality of our results. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefs institutional background 
of China’s privatization. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 analyzes 
impacts of privatization on performance controlled for non-privatized firms. Section 4 explores 
impacts of privatization on restructuring and corporate governance. Section 5 investigates 
factors which affect city governments’ decisions on privatization. This analysis also serves as 
instruments for further resolving endogeneity problem associated with privatization selection. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarizing the major discoveries.  
 
I. Privatization in China 
More than twenty years of reforms in China are marked by the government’s 
piecemeal and gradual approach. The reform of the state-owned enterprises is no 
exception. Instead of outright privatization, China concentrated first on productivity 
improvement by initiating enterprise governance structures that stressed autonomy and 
better incentives and then later by adopting long-term managerial contracts with pre-
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specified financial targets (such as profits and taxes). Instead of introducing markets and 
liberalizing prices overnight, China first created markets at the margin, parallel to the 
planned economy, by introducing the “dual-track system” in the state industrial sector 
and by lowering bureaucratic barriers to entry to the once state-monopolized industries. 
Admittedly, the reforms brought about fundamental improvements in output and 
productivity. The marginal productivity of labor increased by 54 percent and the growth 
in total factor productivity (TFP) was 4.68-6 percent per year during 1980-89 (Li, 1997; 
Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton, 1994). 
However, despite significant output expansion and productivity gains, the 
profitability of the SOEs declined substantially and most of them were losing money in 
the early 1990s. As a result, many SOEs were deeply in debt and, by 1994, close to half 
of the SOEs had zero or negative equity. With SOEs relying on 70-80 percent of all bank 
credit, the banks were saddled with as much as US$200 billion in uncollectible debt, 
which accounted for, by conservative estimates, a quarter of all outstanding bank loans 
(USA Today, Sept. 8, 1997).    
Most Chinese state-owned firms were local SOEs, controlled by city governments 
(Xu, 2008). To deal with loss-making local SOEs and the large amount of local public 
debt built up by the state sector some Chinese some city governments initiated 
privatization since the early 1990s. A well documented city level privatization 
experiment was carried out in Zhucheng city, Shandong province. With more than two 
thirds of city SOEs making losses, the city government converted a large number of these 
SOEs into employee shareholding in 1992. Similarly, Shunde city of Guangdong 
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province privatized most of its state and collective firms in 1992 to deal with its serious 
debt problem caused by losses of those firms (Garnaut et al., 2005).    
Under severe political and ideological constraints, to contain the risks of 
privatization, a prevailing privatization strategy chosen by most Chinese city 
governments is insider privatization, selling ownership of SOEs and COEs to their 
employees and managers. Employee ownership was particularly popular at earlier stages 
of privatization, whereas management buy-out dominates when privatization becomes 
large scale when the mandate of privatization was sanctioned by the central government. 
In addition to initiating privatization, city governments also acted as a (imperfect) 
substitute for legal institutions (Pistor and Xu, 2005). Since there was no constitutional 
protection for private property rights until April 2004, ad hoc government protection 
(promises) to private firms was crucial to firm development.  
The local privatization experiment was sanctioned as a national policy by the 
central government through several steps. In 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth 
Chinese Communist Party Congress endorsed the creation of a modern enterprise system, 
which approved the development of diversified forms of ownership through privatization 
although much of the political constraints on privatization were still in the place. In 1995, 
the central government decided on the policy of “retain the large, release the small” 
(zhuada fangxiao). That is, the state was to keep the largest 300 SOEs in strategic 
industries and in principle would allow smaller firms to be privatized by their ‘owners,’ 
mostly city governments. Finally, a green light was given by the Chinese Communist 
Party’s 15th Congress (1997), which granted de jure ownership of local SOEs to Local 
governments, mostly city governments, who had the de facto ownership of those firms. 
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Large scale privatization began in the late 1990s.  However, due to political and 
ideological constraints, privatization in China has been in a camouflaged form that the 
term “privatization” is officially disguised as “transforming the system” or “gaizhi” in 
Chinese. More precisely, gaizhi means changing ownership structures of SOEs. It 
includes partial privatization and full privatization, also ownership restructurings without 
involving privatization. Specifically, it covers public offering, internal restructuring, 
bankruptcy and reorganization, joint ventures or merger, employee shareholding (limited 
liability companies or cooperatives), open sales (to management, employees, outside 
private firms, or another SOE), and leasing (to management, employees, outside private 
firms, or other SOEs) (Garnaut et al., 2005).  
Public offering involves partial privatization since by the Chinese law the state retains 
the majority of the shares after public offering. Internal restructuring, including 
incorporation, spinning off, introducing new investors, and debt–equity swaps, as well as 
bankruptcy/reorganization, often involves partial privatization but may also involves no 
privatization in the case that a structuring is among state-owned firms. The latter case is 
concentrated in super large scale SOEs owned by the central government and they enjoy 
monopolistic powers in markets, such as oil, electricity, telecommunication, etc. 
Similarly, joint venture or merger involve privatization in the cases where a SOE forms a 
joint venture with or merge with a private domestic or foreign firm. Indeed these cases 
occurred a lot. 
One of the most important gaizhi measures deployed was Employee shareholding, 
which often involves full privatization or nearly full privatization. It was particularly 
popular at early stages of gaizhi due to the rule of the central government that each 
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privatization plan must be approved by employees before implementation. In addition, 
closely associated with privatization, to pave roads for restructuring (layoff) it is critical 
to remove employees’ ‘tenured’ state-employee status. For this purpose, shares were 
often offered as part of the compensation schemes. At later stages of gaizhi when 
conditions were ready for managers to take over they bought majority shares from 
employees. This explains a large part of the MBOs in China. In recent years, as 
privatization proceeds, open sale becomes a popular approach. Under open sale, the firm 
is openly sold to insiders, mostly managers, or outsiders, such as other firms or outside 
managers, through auctions or negotiations between local government and potential 
buyers.   
The last major category of privatization approaches is Leasing. Lessee can be 
outsiders, who are owners other firms, and insiders. In terms of use rights of the assets of 
a firm, leasing is very similar to those of MBO. Indeed some of the MBO owner-
managers were lessees at early stages of privatization.  
To our knowledge, besides officially registered ownership type, there is no 
official statistics on privatization. However, a very large number of former SOEs have 
registered different ownership type with or without privatization, the meaning of the 
officially registered ownership type is too ambiguous to infer statistics of privatization.3 
Thus, we have to use our random sampling survey result to estimate the nationwide 
picture.  In our surveyed sample, 62.8% of the SOEs and COEs were privatized by the 
end of 2004. Given our sample is constructed to match the population in ownership, size, 
location and industry (for further discussions, see next section) we infer that from 1998 to 
                                                 
3 Based on our survey sample, we will report statistical details on this issue in a later version of the paper.  
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the end of 2004, 92,493 initially state-owned firms (with sales above 5 million RMB) had 
been privatized with total assets of 11.4 trillion RMB. 
 
II. The Sample and the Empirical Methods 
II.A. The Nationwide Survey  
 The main data comes from our nationwide sampling survey of Chinese firms in 
the early 2006. Our sampling survey is based on the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
census of all industrial firms with sales above 5 million RMB. Based on the 2004 
population, we drew a random sample of 16,400 firms stratified by region, industry, size, 
and ownership type. Since only 20% in the 2004 population are SOEs and our intention is 
to study privatization, we on purposely over-sampled SOEs. Thus we drew an additional 
random sample of 5500 SOEs from the 1998 NBS database,4 again stratified based on 
region, industry, and size. 
The questionnaires were designed through interactive processes. Several rounds 
of pilot surveys were carried out through on-site interviews and telephone interviews in 
nine cities, including Beijing, Laizhou (Shandong), Taizhou and Changxing (Zhejiang), 
Changchun and Jilin (Jilin Province), Shijiazhuang, Pingshan and Tangshan (Hebei), with 
720 samples.  
The large scale survey was conducted through telephone interviews. We hired a 
professional survey company that had a close relationship with the National Bureau of 
Statistics and had previously helped NBS to conduct its own surveys. We spent a week to 
                                                 
4 We drew the additional SOE sample from 1998 NBS database for two reasons. First, large scale 
privatization started in late 1990s. If we use 2004 population to identify SOEs, we would have missed 
many that have already been privatized. Second, 1998 is the first year that the NBS database is available 
and thus is the year with the best chance for us to identify SOEs potentially to be privatized. 
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train the staff of the survey company to understand each question. Throughout the survey, 
we worked closely with the staff and supervised the progress carefully.  
Two sets of questionnaires are designed for privatized firms (Questionnaire A) 
and for other firms (Questionnaire B). The Questionnaires A and B are identical except 
questions related to privatization. This enables us to distinguish the effect of privatization. 
In the survey, every randomly selected firm was first asked about whether it was 
privatized and a corresponding questionnaire will be applied.  
Our overall response rate was about 18%.  The sample that we obtained includes 
899 privatized firms, 475 non-privatized SOEs, and 1685 de novo private or non-state 
firms (de novo private firms hereafter). Our survey sample matches the distributions of 
the population in most dimensions reasonably well, except for SOE ownership and size 
because we deliberately over-sampled SOE firms. Moreover, we do not notice any 
systematic selection of firms that did not respond to our survey. Table 1 compares the 
distribution of our survey sample with that of the full population. 
 
II.B. The Sample 
Given the earliest financial data available to us is 1998, to ensure that all 
privatized firms have at least one-year of performance information prior to privatization, 
we drop 168 firms that were privatized prior to 1999. By further excluding firms without 
valid financial information, our final sample for empirical analysis included 717 
privatized firms, 460 SOEs that have not been privatized and 1758 de novo private firms. 
Table 2 reports the summary statics of the main variables used in our empirical analysis. 
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 Panel A of Table 2 reports some basic facts of China’s privatization. Starting from 
2000 and up to 2005, the year prior to the survey, privatization steadily picked up. 
Management buy-outs are by far the most widely used method, accounting for about one 
half (47%) of all privatization programs. The next is selling to outsiders, which is used in 
22% of privatization programs. The rest privatization methods include joint venture (2%), 
leasing (8%), and employee holding (10%).5  
 The ownership structure of most privatized firms is highly concentrated. The 
largest shareholders on average hold 60% of the shares and the second and third largest 
shareholders hold 26% of shares. Probably reflecting new owners being introduced, in 
MBOs and Selling to Outsiders, the largest shareholders have 37% and 64% ownership, 
respectively. 
Concentrated ownership has both its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, 
concentrated ownership has the benefit of mitigating the free-rider problem in monitoring 
managers and, in the case of insider ownership, aligning managerial interests with those 
of shareholders. On the other hand, concentrated ownership comes with a well-known 
cost. That is, a large shareholder can expropriate the resources from outside minority 
shareholders. This expropriation problem is potentially strongest in countries with weak 
property rights protection, where much privatization occurs. As pointed out by Deng, 
Gan, and He (2008), expropriation by large shareholders is the root cause of the failure of 
share issue privatization in China. Thus it remains to be seen as to how the incentives of 
large shareholders play out in among non-SIP. Panel B is a summary of the 
financial variables of Chinese firms. We use two measures of operating performance: one 
                                                 
5 Finally, some of the largest SOEs were partial privatized through share issuing. It counted for about 3(?)% 
of all the privatized firms. 
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is operating profits (earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation, EBITDA) over assets; 
the other is operating profits over the number of employees. In the top part of Panel B, 
SOEs tend to be larger, more leveraged, and less profitable. Within SOEs, privatized 
firms are larger, but do not have any consistent pattern in terms of operating efficiency. 
The bottom part of Panel B compares the performance changes for privatized 
firms. Worth reporting is that privatized firms tend to become less leveraged after 
privatization, probably reflecting a hardened budget constraint by average. For both 
measures of performance, there is a significant improvement in terms of median (1%) 
level. Among MBO firms, the performance gain is also significant and tends to be larger. 
Moreover, MBO firms are less profitable in both measures prior to privatization. We will 
analyze this issue later in Section VI. 
 
II.C Empirical Methods 
In the following sections we are going to address the following major issues: the 
consequences of privatization in restructuring and in improving performance; the 
effectiveness of different privatization methods; and the factors affecting local 
governments’ decisions on privatization methods. Turns out, these issues are closely 
intertwined both in reality and in empirical investigation methodology.  
For example, a common concern about performance comparison in the 
privatization literature is that privatization decision is not random. That is, unobserved 
firm characteristics may simultaneously drive privatization decision (which firm to 
privatize and what privatization method to use) and firm performance. In our setting, it 
may be possible that the better firms are privatized or be chosen by a particular method of 
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privatization. If so, the correlation between privatization and performance may imply a 
reversed causality.   
In our empirical analysis, we simultaneously address the intertwined economic 
issues and the selection issue in three ways. First, we use a differences-in-differences 
approach to evaluate the effect of privatization in the panel data setting. In particular, we 
compare the difference in performance improvement between privatized firms and the 
control group, not privatized SOEs. Further, we control for firm fixed effects in our 
estimation of the differences-in-differences estimates. Thus any time-invariant firm 
characteristics that might be related to privatization decisions are completely controlled 
for.  
Second and more importantly, we examine the mechanisms through which 
privatization improved performance. By revealing what had been done in restructuring 
and in change of corporate governance after privatization, reversed causality problem is 
further ruled out. 
Finally, we study how local governments’ incentives affect their decisions on 
privatization methods. In addition to its own value as a major discovery, this relationship 
is also served as an instrument to deal with the endogeneity problem of privatization 
decisions.  
 
III. Differences-in-Differences Analysis of Privatization Outcome 
To examine the performance improvement of privatized firms, we adopt the 
difference-in-difference approach and focus on performance improvement of privatized 
firms in comparison with non-privatized SOEs. For different firms, privatization occurred 
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in different years since the late 1990s but the NBS financial data is only available from 
1998 to 2005. To fully utilize the information in the data, we examine the effect of 
privatization based on panel data regressions of the following form:6 
 
Performanceit = αi + βt + γ Postit + δXit + εit,    (1) 
                                   
where Performanceit is measured by both ROA and earnings per employee. Postit is a 
dummy variable indicating years after privatization (it is set to zero for those SOE that 
has never been privatized). Xit are firm control variables that might be related to 
profitability, including size (measured as log of assets), leverage (debt over assets), and 
lag of profitability to account for potential mean reversion in profits. αi is a firm fixed 
effect, which controls for any time-invariant firm characteristics that may affect 
privatization decisions. βt is a year fixed effect. Coefficient γ is the differences-in-
differences estimate of the effect of privatization on firm performance. 
 
III.A  The Baseline Estimation 
In Panel A of Table 3, we first present an overall picture of the operating 
performance of Chinese firms. The regressions include 46 industry dummies based on 
NBS industry classification, which is similar to 2-digit SIC codes, to control for industry 
influences such as technology and competition. Consistent with casual observations and 
popular reports, in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, both privatized and non-privatized 
SOEs have significantly weaker performance than de novo private firms (at the 1% 
                                                 
6 The privatization literature sometimes compares performance three-years before and after privatization. 
This is not possible for many privatized firms since the financial data is only available for 1998-2005. 
Panel data analysis not only allows to fully utilize the information available but also accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity, through firm fixed effects, that might affect privatization decisions. 
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levels). In columns (3) and (4) of Panel A, we add a dummy indicating Post-privatization 
years for privatized firms (Post). It is not significantly different from zero. Thus, after 
privatization, the firms become similar to those firms in the private sector, which 
suggests some efficiency gain.  
In Panel B, we further examine the performance improvement of privatized firms 
by comparing the relative performance of privatized vs. non-privatized SOEs, which 
should be a better benchmark. In the first two columns, we report results without firm 
fixed effects. Indeed, for both performance measures, the Post dummy is positive, 
although only marginally significant at the 15% levels. It is worth noting that the 
coefficient on Privatized Firms in the regressions captures the performance prior to 
privatization for those privatized firms. It is not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting that, there is not systematic selection of privatized firms in terms of operating 
performance.  
In columns (3) and (4), we report the estimation results with firm fixed effects. 
Strikingly, the coefficient on the Post dummy now becomes statistically insignificant. 
This highlights the importance of unobserved firm heterogeneity:  privatization overall 
does not seem to have improved operating efficiency controlling for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity.  
As we discussed earlier, China adopted a varieties of approaches to privatization, 
including both explicit ownership changes (such as MBOs or selling to outsiders), and 
other methods without explicit ownership changes (such as leasing, joint venture, and 
public listing). These different methods provide very different incentive and ability for 
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the new owners to improve efficiency. Thus it is important to examine the different 
methods separately, which is done in the next subsection. 
 
III.B  Privatization Methods and Performance Improvement 
In this section, we investigate, among privatized firms, the effectiveness of 
different privatization methods. Given that previous work on Russia and Central 
European countries has found that insider privatization has failed to improve performance 
(e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Frydman et al., 1999), we are particularly 
interested in those management-buy-out firms, where control rights are transferred to the 
hands of “insiders.” We obtain the differences-in-differences estimates from the 
following model, based on the sample of privatized SOEs: 
 
   Performanceit = αi + βt + γ Postit +λ MBOi x Postit + δXit + εit,      (2) 
 
where MBOi x Postit is the interaction between MBOs and the Post dummy, which 
captures the differential performance improvement between MBOs and other methods of 
privatization. The other terms are defined in the same way as those in Equation (1), 
In the first two columns of Table 4, we report results without firm fixed effects. 
The interaction between MBO and the Post dummy is significantly positive for both 
measures of performance (at the 5% and the 10% levels). The coefficient on the Post 
dummy itself is not significant, suggesting that privatization methods other than MBOs 
do not improve performance. 
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In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we add firm fixed effects. The point estimates 
of MBO*Post becomes larger and more significant (at the 5% and 1% levels for the two 
performance measures respectively). The Post dummy itself is not significantly different 
from zero for ROA and significantly negative for profits over employment (at the 5% 
level), which again suggests that non-MBOs do not improve efficiency. This finding is 
broadly consistent with prior work examining share issue privatization.  
In columns (5) and (6), we examine the effectiveness of the other type of explicit 
ownership change, that is, Selling to Outsiders. It turns out that the interaction between 
Selling to Outsiders and Post is not significantly different from zero. Thus in contrast to 
the findings in other transitional economies where outsider-controlled privatization 
improves performance, in China selling to outsiders is not sufficient to improve 
performance. 
 So far, we find that MBOs, which represents in close to half of the privatization 
programs, have significantly improved operating efficiency. Our differences-in- 
differences approach controls for systematic change in performance, as well as any time-
invariant unobserved firm characteristics that simultaneously affect MBO decisions and 
performance. However, some concerns about selection remain. First, MBO firms may 
have deliberately suppressed their earnings prior to privatization so that managers could 
negotiate a better price from the government in the buy-outs. Second, managers may have 
private information about the future prospects of the company and thus choose to buy out 
the better ones.  
 The remaining of the paper is devoted to deal with these concerns. First we 
examine the mechanisms that drive the better performance of the MBO firms. Second, we 
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deals with the endogeneity of MBOs using instrumental variables related to the regional 
(city-level) government incentives.  
 
IV. Understanding the Mechanism of Efficiency Gain 
We now examine the mechanism through which MBOs improve operating 
efficiency. As outlined in Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996), there are 
two potential channels through which privatization may improve efficiency. The first is 
an incentive theory (Holmstrom, 1979); that is, private owners have greater incentives 
than government appointees to improve profits since they bear the financial consequences 
of their decisions. The other is the human capital theory: privatization selects managers 
who are better at running the firms efficiently. While these two channels are not mutually 
exclusive, it is useful to understand to what extent each one leads to the success of 
China’s privatization. 
 
IV.A Allocation of Control Rights and Incentives: The State Influence 
A common feature of privatization programs around the world is that they are 
partial privatization, i.e., the government retains significant ownership in privatized firms 
(Jones et al., 1999; Gupta, 2005). Since the state could have political goals that are 
different from profit-maximization, state control is likely to reduce the effectiveness of 
privatization. Thus the first question we ask in searching for the mechanism of improved 
efficiency is whether the state has retreated from the firms’ daily operation. 
We measure state control in two ways. The first is whether the state shares are 
above 20%, which is about the sample mean, as well as an ownership level that is likely 
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to allow government to exert influence on the firms.7 In our data, the distribution of 
government ownership is uneven, however, close to 80% of firms have zero government 
ownership.  
Our second measure of state control is based on our survey question regarding 
state intervention in corporate decision making. We ask explicitly the allocation of 
control rights among government, party committees, CEOs, corporate boards, and 
shareholder meetings in making key corporate decisions. The corporate decisions include 
the appointment of top managers, employment/layoffs and wages/compensation, 
corporate financial issues, production, and operations. These control rights are rated with 
scores ranging from 0 to 5 in the order of greater importance.8 We calculate the average 
influence on the corporate decisions for each party. After the privatization, the 
government has almost completely retreated from daily operations of companies, with its 
control rights dropping from 1.9 to 0.4. The control rights of party committees are also 
substantially weakened, from 2.0 to 1.2. Since the government control of the firms can 
come both through direct government intervention and through its influence on firm-level 
party committees, we use the max of these two as the score for overall state influence. 
Despite that the overall state influence drops from 2.8 to 1.4 after privatization, state 
influence is still quite important in a significant proportion of firms, with 39% firms 
having a score above 2 (Somewhat Important) and 15% above 3 (Moderately Important). 
We define our second measure of state control as overall state influence above 2 and the 
results are robust to the alternative cutoff of 3.  
                                                 
7 The firms report two types of state ownership. One is direct government ownership; the other is (indirect) 
ownership through other SOEs. As discussed in detail in Deng, Gan, and He (2008), the latter is common in 
share issue privatization. In the survey sample, most state ownership is reported to be direct ownership. 
8 0 is zero influence, 1 is slightly important, 2 is somewhat important, 3 is moderately important, 4 is 
important, 5 is absolutely important. 
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It is important to note that MBO firms have significantly lower level of state 
control in both measures. Table 5 shows that, MBOs are much likely to have state 
influence. The average state ownership is only 1%, significantly lower than the sample 
average of 19%. MBOs are also much less likely to have state intervention in its daily 
decision making (16% vs. 31% sample mean). 
Table 6 demonstrates that state control hinders performance of privatized firms. In 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, state ownership is associated with significant worse post-
privatization performance (at the 5% and the 10% levels). In columns (3) and (4), state 
influence in daily decision making is associated with lower operating efficiency (at the 
1% and 10% levels). These results highlight that the success of privatization depends 
critically on whether the government could commit to retreating from the daily operations 
of firms and refraining from using the firms to achieve its political objectives. In the 
Chinese case, a big political objective in many regions is employment. The fact that we 
have found that MBOs significant improve earnings per employee ratio suggests that one 
reason that state control reduces efficiency is that firms cannot lay off excess workers 
based on economic considerations. 
 
IV.B Post-Privatization Restructuring Measures 
In this subsection, we further examine the restructuring measures that MBO firms 
undertake after privatization that could enhance incentives and / or improve efficiency. In 
our survey, we investigate four restructuring measures. They are introduction of new 
human capital through changes of the management team; performance-based pay, which 
could enhance incentives in addition to equity ownership; adoption of international 
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accounting standard; and establishment of a board of directors. It is worth noting that in 
MBO firms, since ownership and control are already aligned, governance does not seem 
to be a big concern. Anecdotal evidences as well as our own conversations with managers 
suggest that board of directors is often established because the firm, at the time of MBO, 
needs to raise financing from other large shareholders who eventually sits on the board 
and because the board can help with professionalization of the firm.9  
As reported in Table 7, MBOs are more like to change members of core 
management team, to adopt international accounting standard and professional 
independent auditing, and to establish a board of directors. Interestingly, consistent with 
aligned interests between principle and agents,10 MBO firms do not need to have 
performance-based pay to further enhance incentives. 
Selling to Outsiders is not likely to change core management team. Probably 
reflecting separated ownership and control, these firms are more likely to use 
performance-based pay to align incentives. Firms sold to outsiders are not more likely to 
adopt international accounting standard, nor do they establish board of directors.  
Noticeably, both adopting international accounting standard and a formal board of 
directors at MBO firms are ways to professionalized the firm and prepare the firm for 
public listing. Thus, it is possible that managers of MBO firms are considering eventually 
listing the firms and thus use the public capital market as an exist strategy. This can be 
part of the reasons why, in contrast to the failure of insider privatization in Eastern 
Europe and Russia (Barberis et al., 1996) MBOs in China are successful. At the time of 
                                                 
9 One of the coauthors of this paper happens to serve in the board of an MBO company, along with lawyers 
and accountants. The board provides valuable professional advice to the company. 
10 Among 471 MBOs, except for 2 firms, managers are the largest shareholder. In the remaining two firms, 
one has the government and the other has workers as the largest shareholder. 
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mass privatization, the countries have not established product markets, labor markets, or 
financial markets. Private ownership is an unfamiliar phenomenon. Under this situation, 
managers or private owners may not have sustained interest in running the firms, nor do 
they have a clear exit strategy. In contrast, when the delayed privatization in China 
happens, market institutions have developed and, equally importantly, the private sector 
has become a big part of the economy. From the measures that they MBO firms have 
taken after privatization in improving efficiency and to professionalize the firms, it is 
clear that incentives are perfectly aligned and the managers could fully capitalize the 
efficiency gain in the eventual sale of the market. 
 As a summary, we find that freedom from state control is associated with better 
performance and state influence is significantly less among MBO firms. Moreover, MBO 
firms are more likely to adopt restructuring measures including change of management 
team, adoption of international accounting standards, and establishment of a board of 
directors. These measures not only introduce new human capital to the privatized firms, 
but also help professionalization of the firms which can makes public listing a potential 
exit strategy. These mechanisms of performance improvement make it hard to argument 
that our findings are simply driven by endogenous selection of MBOs. 
 
V. Endogneous Choice of MBOs  – Two-State Least Square Estimates 
In this section, we provide additional evidence from instrumental-variable (IV) 
estimation to show that our results are not driven by endogenous selection of MBOs. 
Before we present this analysis, we would like to stress that our results so far are 
inconsistent with the selection argument. Our differences-in-differences analysis fully 
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controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity that might lead to selection. Our analysis of 
the mechanism of performance improvement shows that MBO firms are less likely to 
have state influence which hurts performance; that they also do implement restructuring 
measures that enhance managers’ incentives and their abilities to improve performance. 
Finally, as we report in Table 1 (Panel B), MBO firms tend to be weaker performers prior 
to privatization, which could motivate the government to commit not to exert influence 
on the firms through MBOs. Thus “reverse selection” is also possible, which tend to bias 
our differences-in-differences estimates downwards. 
Nevertheless, we address the selection concern empirically, by finding 
instruments for MBOs. We use two sets of instruments. One is related to the 
government’s incentive. Since starting from the late 1990s, privatization has become a 
decision at the level of local governments, except for the very large firms that go public. 
Thus the incentive of the local government plays an important role in choices of 
privatization method. In particular, how likely the government is committed to refraining 
from exerting influence on the firms is the key determinant for MBOs – note that MBO 
firms have the least influence from the government. There are two possible reasons for 
government commitment. One is when firm’s problem is deeper and more radical 
measures are more necessarily. The other is when the government does not need to use 
the firms to achieve its political goals, such as unemployment, social welfare, or fiscal 
balance.  
To this end, we use five variables as direct measure of government incentives and 
three indirect measures including city-level economic and demographic variables that 
may influence government incentives. Direct measure of government incentives include 
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whether the firm has been previously privatized/restructured, whether privatization 
includes land, whether the government provides the firm with land, and whether the 
government provides loan guarantee to the firm, and finally, the fiscal balance of the 
local government (note this is a city-level variable). Indirect measures at the city-level 
include the share of SOE in total industrial output, local GDP per capita, and population 
growth. 
If land is privatized with the firm and if government has provided land “for free,” 
then the government may not want the firms to be bought out by managers unless it can 
be properly compensated. If the firm has relied on government loan guarantees, it is 
possible that the SOE problems are deeper and the government may have more incentive 
to “let it go.” In such cases, the insiders may be at a better position to manage the firm, 
resulting in an MBO.  As to whether the firm has been previously privatized,  its ex ante 
impact is clear. One possibility is that the previous privatization is a failed attempt, which 
gives the government more incentive to let the insiders who are better at running them to 
take over. However, it is also possible that these firms have deeper problems and insiders 
may not be willing to buy it out.11  
The effect of fiscal balance is not obvious ex ante. On the one hand, when the 
government fiscal condition is weak it may be more eager to sell off the company 
completely to raise cash, in which case MBO is a likely choice since MBO firms typical 
has less ties with the government afterwards. However, it is also possible that in areas 
where fiscal condition is weak, the government does not have the financial resources to 
fulfill its social responsibilities, such as social welfare and re-deployment of laid off 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that although this explanation seem to suggest that MBO firms may have relatively 
better quality, it does not drive our results since this variation should be absorbed in the firm fixed effects. 
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workers. Thus it cannot commit to refraining from exerting influence on the firm and thus 
may prefer a more partial privatization so that it could achieve its social and political 
goals, resulting in a lower incidence of MBOs.  
Among the city-level economic variables, we expect the share of SOE output to 
be negatively related to MBOs. As discussed earlier, due to the “delayed” privatization in 
China, by late 1990s, most of the SOEs were losing money and could not pay their 
workers or gave their workers enough work (such “no work” status without being 
formally laid off is called xia gang). This unemployment (both explicit and implicit) 
problem is most severe in areas previously dominated by SOEs. Meanwhile, if there is 
not an active private sector in the local area, the unemployed workers can not easily find 
new jobs. Thus the share of SOE output is meant to capture both the unemployment 
problem and the difficulty in re-deploying laid-off workers.  
 Thus our first-stage regression contains both firm-level (i.e., privatization-
program level) and city-level variables as below: 
 
    MBOi = β Firm-level Variablesi +δ City-level Variablesi + εi.   (3) 
 
We note that our endogenous variable is discrete. In such cases, the two-stage least 
square model can be applied.12  
 Table 8 presents the summary statistics of the instrumental variables. Consistent 
with our conjecture, MBO firms are less likely to have obtained land from government 
for free and land is less likely to be included in privatization (at the 1% levels). MBOs are 
significantly more popular among cities with greater fiscal balance, higher per capital 
                                                 
12 See e.g., Wooldridge (2006). 
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GDP, and greater population growth, Finally, MBOs are less likely to be chosen when the 
share of SOE output is greater, implying greater unemployment and less opportunity to 
deploy laid off workers. 
 Table 9 reports the first stage estimates. As expected, government allocation of 
land is significantly negatively related to MBOs. Government loan guarantee and land 
being included in privatization have the expected signs but are not statistically significant. 
Previous attempts of privatization are significantly negative, consistent with the view that 
managers are less willing to buy out these firms.  
Government fiscal balance is significantly negative, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that in areas with weak fiscal condition, the government prefers a more partial 
privatization so that they could exert its influence on firms to achieve social goals. 
Finally, the share of SOE output is, as expected, significant negative, reflecting the 
incentive of government to use non-MBO and more partial privatization when 
unemployment problem is more severe and re-deployment of laid-off workers is more 
difficult. This finding further supports the less state control and thus greater likelihood to 
lay off excess worker as a mechanism of improved efficiencies for MBO firms. 
 The second-stage estimation results are reported in Table 10. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates presented in Table 4. That is, MBOs 
significantly improve performance (columns (1) and (2) of Table 5). The Post dummy 
itself is significantly negative, suggesting that other methods of privatization are 
associated with worse performance. In columns (3) and (4), Selling to the private sector is 
associated with insignificant performance change for ROA measure but significantly 
reduce performance for earnings per employee. 
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 It is important to note that the point estimates of the endogenous variable 
MBO*Post from the TSLS is about three-times larger than the OLS estimates. To the 
extent that the endogenous choice of MBOs drives the results, instrument-variable 
estimates should be lower than the OLS estimates. Thus what we observed in Table 1 is 
more likely to have happened, that is MBOs tend to be weaker, rather than stronger, firms, 
for which the government could commit not to exert influence later. Thus after correcting 
for this “reverse” selection, our estimated effect of MBOs on performance improvements 
are actually larger than the OLS estimates, which provide further support that 
endogenous choices of MBOs do not drive our results. 
  
VI Conclusion 
Using a unique hand collected nationwide random sampling survey firm level data we 
find what privatization method lead to restructuring and results to improved performance. 
Moreover, we find local governments which had stronger fiscal disciplines and had less 
concerns on potential labor shedding tend to privatize through this method.  The 
endogeneity problem is carefully controlled by several ways to make sure that we have 
discovered causalities, not just correlations.  The following is a short summary of our 
major discoveries. 
a) It is a systematic study of China’s privatization at a national level (all regions and 
all industries) covering all small, medium and large firms, and all privatization 
methods; 
b) The impact of China’s privatization on firm performance is mixed that when all 
privatization methods are pooled together, there is no measurable impact; 
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c) Among all major privatization methods, only management buy-out (MBO) had 
significant and positive impacts in improving performance, whereas other 
privatization strategies failed to make a difference; 
d) Compared with other privatization methods, city governments’ role in MBO firms 
were substantially reduced; and MBO firms substantially restructuring more and 
deeper; 
e) Selection bias problems are mitigated in the above discoveries through a 
difference-in-difference approach to control not privatized group (or non MBO 
group) and before privatization performance;  
f) City governments with a stronger fiscal discipline or with less concerns on labor 
shedding were more pro MBO method in privatization; 
The above result d) is not only confirmed but is even stronger when we use city 
governments’ characteristics as instrument variables.  
China’s privatization provides several insights into privatization in general. First, 
the Chinese experiences highlights the importance of both the commitment of the 
government not to intervene in corporate decisions and the incentives of large 
shareholders. The governments’ continued influence in privatized firms hurt performance. 
Meanwhile, only when the large shareholders’ incentives are in place, would will the 
firms undertake fundamental restructuring measures to enhance efficiency. Second, the 
Chinese experience suggests that postponing privatization to accumulate create stable 
market institutions increases the effectiveness of privatization. In particular, the 
privatized firms can benefit from the established labor markets for managerial talent and 
from better developed financial institutions to obtain external financing. Finally, 
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established capital market can provide an exit strategy for the new owners to capitalize on 
the efficiency gains.  
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Number % Number %
(1) (2)                  (3)                  (4)                  
Panel A: Ownership Distribution
SOEs & COEs 904                30% 61,596           19%
Private 1,012             34% 136,158         42%
Joint Venture and Foreign Owned 447                15% 61,595           19%
others 696                21% 64,837           20%
Panel B: Size Distribution
Large 87                  3% 3,242             1%
Medium 491                17% 35,660           11%
Small 2,419             80% 285,284         88%
Panel C: Regional Distribution
North 300                10% 25,936           8%
North-East 209                7% 22,693           7%
North-West 150                5% 12,967           4%
North-Central 480                16% 48,628           15%
South-West 180                6% 16,209           5%
East 1,019             34% 113,465         35%
South 419                14% 58,353           18%
South-Central 240                8% 25,935           8%
Panel D: Industry Distribution
non-manufacturing industries 1                    0% 13                  0%
Mining 273                9% 37,662           12%
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 264                9% 29,431           9%
Textiles 366                12% 49,402           15%
Timber and Paper Products 275                9% 28,441           9%
Petroleum & Chemical 495                17% 49,159           15%
Metals 633                21% 66,682           21%
Machine and Electronics 515                17% 53,351           16%
Electricity, Gas and Water 175                6% 10,045           3%
Table 1. Sample Distribution of Ownership, Size, Location, and Industry 
This table compares the distribution of our survey sample with that of the population by ownership, 
size, location, and industry. The NSB database does not have information on ownership; thus we infer 
ownership based on registration type. North China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei; North-East: 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; North-West: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Innermongolia; 
Noth-Central: Shanxi, Henan, Shandong; South-West: Xizang, Yunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing; 
East: Shanghai Jiangsu, Zhejiang; South: Guangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan; South-Central: Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui. 
Survey Sample Population
Table 2. Basic Facts and Summary Statistics
Panel A: Basic Facts of China's Privatization
A.1 Year of Privatization
Year # of firms Percentage
1999 60 8%
2000 103 14%
2001 102 14%
2002 109 15%
2003 129 18%
2004 95 13%
2005 108 15%
2006 11 2%
Total 717 100%
A2. Methods+A32 of Privatization
# of firms Percentage
Explicit Ownership Change:
MBO 338 47%
Selling to Outsiders 157 22%
Without Explicit Ownership Change:
Listed 8 1%
JointVenture 11 2%
Lease 56 8%
Employee Holding 70 10%
Others 77 11%
Total 717 100%
A3. Ownership of Privitized Firms
MBO
Selling to 
Outsiders Other All
Ownership by the Largest Shareholder Mean 37%*** 64% 91%*** 60%
Median (30%***) (70%) (100%***) (51%)
Ownership by the Second and Third Largest Shareholder Mean 27%** 20%*** 30%* 26%
Median (22%**) (15%***) (30%**) (20%)
This table presents basic facts of China's privatization and summary statistics of financial variables used in the empirical analysis. Profits are defined as earnings before interest, tax, and 
depreciation. Significance levels are all based on two-tailed tests of differences. In Panel A.3 differences between the MBO firms and other methods and between Selling to Outsiders 
and other methods are tested. Differences between SOEs and non-SOEs are tested in column (5) of Panel B.1, differences between MBOs and non-MBOs are tested in column (4) of 
Panel B.2 . Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Table 2. Basic Facts and Summary Statistics (Cont'd)
Panel B: Financial Information of Chinese Firms
B.1 Overview of Financial Information of Chinese Firms
Whole Sample Privatized Non-Privatized Difference Non-SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assets (in thousands) Mean 165,365 310,034 220,416 89,619*** 46,205***
Median (25,146) (54,295) (42,772) (11,523***) (14,398*** )
Sales (in thousands) Mean 115,127 198,769 131,551 67,218*** 52,906***
Median ( 20,475) (26,533) (19,905) (6,628***) (18,400***)
Leverage Mean 0.092 0.137 0.138 -0.0016 0.043***
Median (0.003) (0.057) (0.048) (0.009) (0***)
Profit / Assets Mean 0.108 0.073 0.059 0.014*** 0.152***
Median (0.067) (0.045) (0.038) (0.007***) (0.099***)
Profit / Sales Mean 0.063 0.030 0.031 -0.001 0.097
Median (0.075) (0.075) (0.065) (0.01***) (0.078***)
Profit / #Employee Mean 22.000 14.317 16.656 -2.339** 29.270***
Median (9.240) (6.790) (4.742) (2.048***) (13.821***)
Number of Firms 13,676 4,360 2,754 6,495
B.2 Financial Variables Before and After Privatization
MBOs
Before After Difference Before After Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assets (in thousands) Mean 260,428 389,630 129,202*** 117,114*** 167,404 50,290***
Median (54,685) (53,989) (-697) (44,237***) (38,609) (-5,629)
Sales (in thousands) Mean 155,596 268,043 112,447*** 77,595*** 141,074 63,479***
Median (24,662) (31,691) (7,029***) (22,121***) (24,452) (2,331***)
Leverage Mean 0.143 0.126 -0.017*** 0.132** 0.114 -0.019**
Median (0.072) (0.040) (-0.032***) (0.069**) (0.029) (-0.04***)
Profit / Assets Mean 0.054 0.102 0.048*** 0.047** 0.130 0.083***
Median (0.039) (0.057) (0.018***) (0.036) (0.065) (0.029***)
Profit / Sales Mean 0.023 0.043 0.020 0.016 0.069 0.052***
Median (0.071) (0.084) (0.013***) (0.065***) (0.085) (0.02***)
Profit / #Employee Mean 10.883 19.682 8.799*** 7.901*** 20.889 12.988***
Median (5.230) (10.693) (5.463***) (4.449***) (10.894) (6.445***)
Privatized SOEs
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
Table 3. A First Look at the Effect of Privatization
Profits / Assets
Profits / 
#Employee Profits / Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
(1)                       (2)                       (3)                       (4)                       
Panel A. Performance of Chinese Firms
Lag of Perfmance 0.633*** 0.061 0.633*** 0.061
(0.067)                (0.053)                (0.067)                (0.053)                
Log (sales) 0.012*** 11.452*** 0.012*** 11.460***
(0.002)                (0.867)                (0.002)                (0.866)                
Leverage -0.021* -0.574 -0.021* -0.591
(0.012)                (2.975)                (0.012)                (2.977)                
Privatized Firms -0.039*** -24.743*** -0.040*** -24.204***
(0.006)                (2.310)                (0.006)                (2.273)                
SOE -0.041*** -19.628*** -0.041*** -19.594***
(0.006)                (2.193)                (0.006)                (2.182)                
Post Dummy 0.001 -0.961
(0.009)                (1.678)                
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9412 9308 9412 9308
R-squared 0.29 0.15 0.29 0.15
Panel B. Effect of Privatization on Performance
Lag of Perfmance 0.629*** 0.473*** 0.051 -0.02
(0.067)                (0.093)                (0.198)                (0.060)                
Log (sales) 0.010*** 5.341*** 0.068*** 11.938***
(0.002)                (0.600)                (0.014)                (1.663)                
Leverage -0.036*** -2.046 -0.049 -3.765
(0.012)                (3.099)                (0.040)                (5.583)                
Privatized Firms -0.003 -2.419**
(0.005)                (1.221)                
Post Dummy 0.015 1.892 0.016 -1.222
(0.010)                (1.230)                (0.014)                (1.695)                
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 4903 4840 4903 4840
R-squared 0.32 0.48 0.63 0.77
This table presents the OLS estimates of the effect of privatization on firm performance, based on the 
sample containing both privatized and non-privatized SOEs. Performance measures are calculated as 
operating profits (earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation) over assets, sales, and number of 
employees, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Performance Measures Performance Measures
Table 4. The Influence of Privatization Method 
Profits / 
Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
Profits / 
Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
Profits / 
Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
(1)                  (2)                  (3)                  (4)                  (5)                  (6)                  
Lag of Perfmance 0.608*** 0.564*** 0.027 0.042 0.027 0.042
(0.018)           (0.018)           (0.219)           (0.092)           (0.219)           (0.092)           
Log (sales) 0.011*** 4.874*** 0.084*** 13.590*** 0.084*** 13.585***
(0.002)           (0.358)           (0.021)           (1.569)           (0.021)           (1.569)           
Leverage -0.045** -2.532 -0.002 3.59 -0.002 3.672
(0.020)           (2.916)           (0.025)           (3.942)           (0.025)           (3.951)           
Post Dummy -0.003 0.025 -0.018 -5.573** -0.019 -4.784
(0.011)           (1.655)           (0.020)           (2.750)           (0.034)           (4.133)           
MBO * Post 0.039** 4.225* 0.062** 8.179*** 0.064* 7.391*
(0.016)           (2.305)           (0.027)           (2.923)           (0.039)           (4.249)           
Outsider Control * Post 0.004 -1.745
(0.036)           (4.658)           
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3025 2991 3025 2991 3025 2991
R-squared 0.33 0.42 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.69
This table presents the influence of different privatization methods on firm performance, based on the sample of privatized firms. 
Performance measures are calculated as operating profits (earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation) over assets, sales, and 
number of employees, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Performance Measures Performance Measures Performance Measures
Table 5. Allocation of Control Rights and Restructuring Measures
Panel A. State Ownership and Control
State Ownership Above 
Mean 
Strong State Control in 
Corporate Decision 
Making
MBO 1%*** 16%***
Selling to Outsiders 15% 25%*
Other 50% 59%
Whole Sample 19% 31%
Panel B: Post-Privatization Restructuring Measures 
Change of Core 
Management Team
Performance Based 
Compensation
International Accounting 
& Independent Auditing 
Establishing Board of 
Directors
MBO 64% 8% 11%** 84%***
Selling to Outsiders 61% 15%*** 7% 67%***
Other 60% 2% 5% 71%
Whole Sample 62% 7% 8% 76%
This Table presents the percentage of firms in each privatization methods that are still have strong state influence. Significance 
levels are based on two-tailed tests of differences between the MBO firms and other methods and between Selling to Outsiders 
and other methods; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 5. The Influence of State Control
Profits / Assets
Profits / 
#Employee Profits / Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
(1)                         (2)                         (3)                         (4)                         
Lag of Perfmance 0.027 0.044 0.025 0.043
(0.219)                  (0.092)                  (0.219)                  (0.092)                  
Log (sales) 0.085*** 13.627*** 0.085*** 13.609***
(0.021)                  (1.575)                  (0.021)                  (1.570)                  
Leverage -0.002 3.555 -0.006 3.198
(0.025)                  (3.919)                  (0.025)                  (3.924)                  
Post Dummy 0.031** 0.407 0.041** 0.847
(0.015)                  (1.655)                  (0.018)                  (1.729)                  
State Share Above Mean * Post -0.107** -11.059*
(0.052)                  (5.911)                  
State Control in Decision Making * Post -0.083*** -6.729*
(0.030)                  (3.566)                  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3025 2991 3025 2991
R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.68
This table presents the OLS estimates of the effect of privatization on firm performance, based on the sample of 
privatized firms. Performance measures are calculated as operating profits (earnings before interest, tax, and 
depreciation) over assets, sales, and number of employees, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Performance Measures Performance Measures
Table 7. Restructuring and Professionalization of Privatized Firms
Change of Core 
Management 
Team
Performance 
Based 
Compensation
International 
Accounting & 
Independent 
Auditing 
Establishing 
Board of 
Directors
(1)                       (2)                       (3)                            (4)                       
Lag of Perfmance -0.073** -0.264*** 0.192*** 0.244***
(0.036)                (0.080)                (0.065)                     (0.046)                
Log (sales) -0.223 0.45 -3.570*** -0.069
(0.343)                (0.773)                (0.992)                     (0.408)                
Leverage -0.631** 0.422** -0.522 -0.501***
(0.302)                (0.187)                (0.575)                     (0.182)                
Selling to Private Sector -0.166 1.793*** -0.094 -0.055
(0.171)                (0.423)                (0.369)                     (0.203)                
MBOs 0.388** -1.253*** 0.991*** 0.782***
(0.151)                (0.272)                (0.318)                     (0.189)                
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 606 606 606 606
This table presents logit model of restructuring measures and professionalization after privatization. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The financial variables are the three-year average after 
privatization. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, 
Table 8. Summary Statistics of Instrumental Variables
Privatized SOEs MBOs
Firm Level Variables
Government guarantee of loans Mean 0.07 0.07
Government allocation of land Mean 0.69 0.62***
Previous Attempts of Privatization Mean 0.05 0.04
Inclusion of Land in Privatization Mean 0.78 0.73***
City Level Variables
Fiscal Balance (Revenue/Expenditure) Mean 0.67 0.70***
Median 0.71 (0.71***)
Log (GDP per Capita) Mean 9.72 9.77*
Median 9.71 (9.78*)
Population Growth Mean 0.03 0.04*
Median 0.01 (0.01***)
% of Industry Output by SOEs Mean 0.25 0.24
Median 0.17 (0.16*)
This table presents the summary statistics of instrumental variables. Significance 
levels are based on two-tailed tests of differences between the MBO firms and other 
methods; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.
Table 9. Determinants of MBO Choices
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   
Incentives of the Government:
Government guarantee of loans 0.063 0.053 0.054
(0.068)            (0.068)            (0.070)            
Government allocation of land -0.108** -0.109** -0.109**
(0.046)            (0.048)            (0.048)            
Previous Attempts of Privatization -0.178** -0.174** -0.172**
(0.082)            (0.082)            (0.083)            
Inclusion of Land in Privatization -0.047 -0.048 -0.044
(0.053)            (0.054)            (0.054)            
Fiscal Balance (Revenue/Expenditure) 0.192* 0.223* 0.211
(0.109)            (0.126)            (0.203)            
City-Level Economic Variables:
Log (GDP per Capita) -0.031 -0.102** -0.580**
(0.037)            (0.043)            (0.277)            
Population Growth 0.273* 0.206 0.075
(0.152)            (0.147)            (0.163)            
% of Industry Output by SOEs -0.191a -0.177
(0.123)            (0.126)            
Lagged City Level Variables:
Lagged Fiscal Balance (Revenue/Expenditure) 0.002
(0.198)            
Lagged Log (GDP per Capita) 0.506*
(0.277)            
Lagged Population Growth 0.134
(0.122)            
Dummy for the Year of Privatization No Yes Yes
Observations 709 681 663
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.19
Independent Variable: MBO
Table 10 Two-Stage Least Square Estimates of the Effect of MBOs on Performance
Profits / 
Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
Profits / 
Assets
Profits / 
#Employee
(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                   
Lag of Perfmance 0.037* 0.062*** 0.036* 0.061***
(0.021)            (0.022)            (0.021)            (0.022)            
Log (sales) 0.080*** 12.965*** 0.080*** 12.950***
(0.007)            (1.031)            (0.007)            (1.030)            
Leverage 0.001 3.022 0.004 3.566
(0.034)            (5.085)            (0.034)            (5.091)            
Post Dummy -0.089* -15.398** -0.076 -13.063*
(0.049)            (7.408)            (0.050)            (7.514)            
MBO * Post 0.204** 27.595** 0.194** 25.762*
(0.092)            (13.785)          (0.092)            (13.814)          
Outsider Control * Post -0.038 -6.566*
(0.024)            (3.612)            
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2787 2754 2787 2754
R-squared 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.69
Performance Measures Performance Measures
This table presents second stage estimates of the effect of MBO on performance. The first-stage regression is the same as column 
(3) in Table 7. Performance measures are calculated as operating profits (earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation) over 
assets, sales, and number of employees, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
